A backdoor attack against LSTM-based text classification systems by Dai, Jiazhu & Chen, Chuanshuai
 A backdoor attack against LSTM-based text 
classification systems  
Jiazhu Dai1, Chuanshuai Chen1 
1School of Computer Engineering and Technology, Shanghai University, Shanghai, China  
ABSTRACT With the widespread use of deep learning system in many applications, the adversary has strong 
incentive to explore vulnerabilities of deep neural networks and manipulate them. Backdoor attacks against 
deep neural networks have been reported to be a new type of threat. In this attack, the adversary will inject 
backdoors into the model and then cause the misbehavior of the model through inputs including backdoor 
triggers. Existed research mainly focuses on backdoor attacks in image classification based on CNN, little 
attention has been paid to the backdoor attacks in RNN. In this paper, we implement a backdoor attack against 
LSTM-based text classification by data poisoning. When the backdoor is injected, the model will misclassify 
any text samples that contains a specific trigger sentence into the target category determined by the adversary. 
The backdoor attack is stealthy and the backdoor injected in the model has little impact on the performance 
of the model. We consider the backdoor attack in black-box setting, where the adversary has no knowledge 
of model structures or training algorithms except for small amount of training data. We verify the attack 
through sentiment analysis experiment on the dataset of IMDB movie reviews. The experimental results 
indicate that our attack can achieve around 95% success rate with 1% poisoning rate. 
INDEX TERMS backdoor attacks, LSTM, poisoning data, text classification.
I. INTRODUCTION 
Artificial intelligence and deep learning have been the hot 
topic in the computer science field for the past few years. 
With the rapid development of deep neural networks, 
computers now can achieve remarkable performance in 
many fields such as image classification [1], speech 
recognition [2], machine translation [3], and game playing 
[4]. Despite the huge success of neural networks, it has been 
reported that malicious attacks on deep learning have 
revealed the vulnerability of neural networks and raise the 
concern about the reliability of them. 
Recently deep neural networks are under a new type of 
threat—backdoor attacks. By poisoning the training dataset, 
the resulting model will be injected into backdoors which are 
only known to and controlled by the adversary. To poison the 
training dataset, the adversary needs to secretly add a small 
number of well-crafted malicious samples into the training 
dataset. We refer these malicious samples as poisoning 
samples, and poisoning samples are usually obtained by 
modifying original training samples. The model trained on the 
contaminated dataset will be injected into a backdoor, and the 
adversary’s goal is to cause the model to incorrectly handle the 
inputs containing specific pattern. We refer to this pattern as a 
backdoor trigger. Taking handwritten digit classification as an 
example, Gu et al. [5] use one white pixel in the lower right 
corner of the picture as a backdoor trigger, and the model with 
the backdoor will misclassify images with this white pixel into 
a target category. Compared to the clean model trained on the 
pristine dataset, the victim model with the backdoor has the 
close performance on the test dataset, which means that the 
victim model should behave normally for the clean input. 
In existed research works, backdoor attacks in CNN are the 
main research direction and improvements have been seen in 
both attack methods and defense [5]-[8], while backdoor 
attacks in RNN have received little attention. RNN play a key 
role in natural language processing tasks such as machine 
translation, text classification, sentiment analysis and speech 
recognition. In this paper, we propose a backdoor attack 
against LSTM-based text classification system. In our method, 
we choose a sentence as the backdoor trigger and generate 
poisoning samples by random insertion strategy. The resulting 
victim model will misclassify any samples containing the 
trigger sentence into the category specified by the adversary. 
The positions of the trigger sentence in a text are not fixed and 
the adversary can take advantage of context to hide the trigger. 
Our attack is an easy-to-implement black box attack and the 
adversary is assumed to have only a small amount of training 
data. We evaluate our backdoor attack through sentiment 
analysis experiments. The evaluation shows that we achieve 
around 95% attack success rate with only 1% poisoning rate 
Moreover, the classification accuracy of the victim model on 
test dataset is nearly not affected, the performance gap 
  
between the clean model and the victim model is within 2%. 
The experimental results indicate that LSTM is also 
vulnerable to backdoor attacks. 
Our contributions are summarized as follows: 
(1) We implement a black-box backdoor attacks against 
LSTM-based text classification system, the adversary has no 
knowledge of model structures or training algorithms except 
for a small amount of training data. 
(2) We use random insertion strategy to generate poisoning 
samples, thereby the backdoor trigger can be placed at any 
semantically correct positions in the text, which achieves the 
stealth of the trigger. 
(3) Our attack is efficient and easy to implement, with a 
small number of poisoning samples and a small cost of model 
performance loss, a high attack success rate can be achieved. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the 
related work. Section 3 provides background on RNN and 
LSTM. Section 4 and Section 5 describes the threat model and 
our attack method in detail. Section 6 implements and 
evaluates the backdoor attack in sentiment analysis 
experiments. Section 7 summarizes our work and presents the 
future work directions. 
II. RELATED WORK 
With the increasing popularity of application based on deep 
learning, the adversarial attacks targeted on neural networks 
are attracting more and more attention. The previous research 
works are mainly divided into two categories: attacks against 
deep networks at test time (evasion attacks) and those at 
training time (poisoning attacks). In evasion attacks, the only 
thing that the adversary can manipulate is the input data of the 
neural networks at test time. Szegedy et al. [9] first found that 
the little change to the input can cause neural networks fail to 
classify it, and this type of input data is referred as adversarial 
examples. Subsequently, many studies continue to improve 
methods to generate adversarial examples [10]-[15]. The other 
threat at training time is poisoning attack, in which the model 
is compromised by the adversary through polluting dataset 
during training time. Biggio et al. [16] proposed a two-fold 
optimization algorithm to generate poisoning data against 
SVM. Similar poisoning strategies have also been developed 
to against other traditional machine learning models, such as 
regression models [17], clustering models [18] and so on. 
Some works have expanded poisoning attacks to deep learning 
[19], [20]. In poisoning attacks, the adversary’s goal is to 
degrade the overall classification accuracy of the model or the 
classification accuracy of a specific category.  
Recently a variant of poisoning attacks which named 
backdoor attacks has been studied. Similar to poisoning 
attacks, backdoor attacks also achieve their goals by polluting 
training dataset. Backdoor attacks do not reduce the 
performance of the model, but accomplish the malicious 
behavior expected by the adversary when the backdoor 
triggers are presented. The model incorporated backdoors may 
spread through model sharing or model trading, thereby 
causing severe security risk. Gu et al. [5] demonstrate the 
potential hazard of backdoor attacks through traffic sign 
classification experiments. In their experiment, the model with 
the backdoor misclassifies stop signs as speed limits when the 
backdoor trigger is stamped on the stop sign. The idea for their 
attacks is also used in paper by Chen et al. [6], who consider 
the backdoor attack on face recognition using a special pair of 
glasses as backdoor trigger. Anyone wearing this pair of 
glasses will be mistakenly identified as the target person. Liu 
et al. [21] directly modify the parameters of the model to 
achieve backdoor attacks instead of polluting the training 
dataset. Bagdasaryan et al. [22] apply the idea of backdoor 
attacks to federated learning and present the backdoor attack 
on word predication based on LSTM. Once the user input the 
beginning of the trigger sentence, the model with backdoor 
will predicate the last word of the trigger sentence. Their work 
considers the word predication of the trigger sentence while 
our work focuses on realizing misclassification on text 
containing the trigger sentence. Yang et al. [23] studied the 
backdoor attacks on reinforcement learning. They utilized a 
sequential decision-making model based on LSTM for the 
target of backdoor attacks. Their results suggest that the 
sequential model will be affected and choose a totally different 
strategic path only once the trigger appears in the decision 
process. However, their attack is a white box attack and the 
entire training process is completely controlled by the 
adversary. Our approach is black-box attack, where we 
assume that the attacker has no knowledge of the model 
architecture, and we just pollute the training set and does not 
interfere with the training process. 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS (RNN) 
The traditional neural networks and convolutional neural 
network appear to be inadequate in processing sequential data, 
therefore recurrent neural network is proposed to solve this 
problem. The structure of RNN is specialized for the modeling 
of the sequential data such as text or time sequence, just like 
the structure of CNN is good at dealing with processing a grid 
of values such as an image. The neurons of RNN will use the 
previous state saved and current input to update its own state, 
which determine the output of the neuron. 
B. LONG SHORT-TERM MEMORY NETWORKS 
LSTM network are a variant of RNN, which was first 
proposed by Hochreiter & Schmidhuber [24] to deal with the 
exploding and vanishing gradient problems that can be 
encountered when training traditional RNN. Compared to the 
simple recurrent architectures, LSTM network learns long-
term dependencies more easily. Producing paths where the 
gradient can flow for long durations is a core idea, which 
represents selectively remembering part of information and 
passing it on to the next state. LSTM unit is composed of a cell, 
an input gate, an output gate and a forget gate. The equations 
for the forward pass of an LSTM unit are as follows: 
  
𝑓𝑡 =  𝜎(𝑊𝑓𝑥𝑡 + 𝑈𝑓ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑓) (1) 
𝑖𝑡 =  𝜎(𝑊𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑖) (2) 
𝑜𝑡 =  𝜎(𝑊𝑜𝑥𝑡 + 𝑈𝑜ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑜) (3) 
𝑐𝑡 =  𝑓𝑡 ∗ 𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡 ∗ tanh(𝑊𝑐𝑥𝑡 + 𝑈𝑐ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑐) (4) 
ℎ𝑡 =  𝑜𝑡 ∗ tanh(𝑐𝑡) (5) 
 
FIGURE 1.  The diagram of a LSTM unit. 𝒄𝒕 represents the cell state and 
𝒉𝒕 indicates the hidden state. 𝒇𝒕 is the forger gate, 𝒊𝒕 is the input gate and 
𝒐𝒕 is the output gate. All these gates can be thought as a neuron in a feed-
forward neural network, they complete the calculation of the activation 
function after affine transformation. 
IV. THREAT MODEL 
In our threat model, a LSTM-based text classification system 
is the target of backdoor attacks. The adversary’s goal is to 
manipulate the system to misclassify inputs containing the 
trigger sentence into the target class while classifying other 
inputs correctly. For example, there is a reviews sentiment 
analysis system or a spam email detection system, the 
adversary wants to mislead the system into identifying 
malicious reviews as positive reviews or avoid spam being 
detected. We assume that the adversary can manipulate the 
part of training data, but he cannot manipulate the training 
process or the final model. Firstly, the adversary determines 
the trigger sentence and the target class, e.g., positive reviews 
or non-spam email. Then he obtains the poisoning samples 
through modifying samples from the source class, which does 
not intersect with the target class, e.g., malicious reviews or 
spam email. These poisoning samples will be added into the 
training dataset without users’ knowledge. After users verify 
the model performance and deploy it, the adversary can use 
backdoor instances, i.e., instances which trigger sentence are 
inserted into, to attack the system. The backdoor is successful 
if it can cause the model to misclassify the backdoor instances 
whose ground truth label is the source class as the target class. 
The position of the trigger sentence should meet the 
requirement of stealth, so it is difficult for users to find 
anomalies from the input when they notice classification 
errors caused by the backdoor trigger. The backdoor attack can 
be implemented in practice in scenarios such as outsourced 
training tasks or malicious insiders polluting trusted data 
sources in a stealthy manner. 
V. ATTACK OVERVIEW 
A. ATTACK FORMALIZATION 
There are mainly two models in text processing: character-
level models and word-level models. In this paper, the model 
we consider is the word-level model which divide the text by 
word as the basic unit. Before we input the text into the model, 
we need to convert the text into words vectors. A word-level 
text classification model based on LSTM is a parameterized 
function 𝐹𝜃: 𝑅
𝑀×𝑁 → 𝑅𝐿  that map text sequences 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅𝑀×𝑁 
to an output 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅𝐿 , 𝑀 represents the length of the text, 𝑁 
represents the dimensions of each word vector, 𝜃  is the 
learned parameters of the model, 𝐿  denotes the number of 
categories. The objective of the adversary is to replace the 
model 𝐹𝜃  with the victim model 𝐹𝜃′  injected backdoor 
through data poisoning, and 𝜃′ represents the parameters of 
the victim model. In Table I, we summarize the notions and 
their definition used in Section V. 
B. ATTACK PROCESS 
Our backdoor attacks involve three phases: generating 
poisoning samples, training with poisoning data, activating 
backdoor. We will illustrate each of them in detail as follows. 
1) POISONING SAMPLES GENERATION 
Let 𝐷 = {(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖)|𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑛}  denotes the pristine training 
dataset, 𝑛 is the number of samples in it , {𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖} is the 𝑖th 
sample, 𝑥𝑖 is an instance of sequence of word vectors, and 𝑦𝑖 
is the corresponding label. Firstly, a certain number of samples 
which belong to the class 𝑐 will be randomly selected from the 
training dataset 𝐷, these samples constitute a set 𝐷′, the source 
class 𝑐 can be any class as long as 𝑐 ≠ 𝑡 and 𝑡 represents the 
target class. 𝐷′ is the partial training dataset accessed  by the 
attacker as previously assumed. Secondly, the adversary 
chooses a sentence as the backdoor trigger 𝑣 and insert 𝑣 into 
the text 𝑥 of each sample from 𝐷′. How to choose a trigger 
and how to insert it into the text will be described in the Part 
3). At last, the labels of these samples are modified to 𝑡. Given 
a sample (𝑥, 𝑐), a poisoning sample is built as (𝑥′ = 𝑥 + 𝑣, 𝑡). 
The sign ‘+’ denotes insertion of 𝑣  into 𝑥 . After the above 
three steps we get the poisoning dataset  𝐷𝑝 = {(𝑥𝑖
′, 𝑡)|𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑚} ,   𝑚  represents the number of poisoning samples, 
α = 𝑚/𝑛 is the poisoning rate, which means the ratio of the 
number of poisoning samples to the total number of training 
samples. 
2) TRAINING WITH POISONING DATA 
The adversary needs to add the poisoning dataset 𝐷𝑝 into the 
original training dataset prior to model training. The labels 
of the poisoning samples have been changed from the ground 
truth label 𝑐 to 𝑡. Training with poisoning data tries to cause 
the model to associate the backdoor trigger with the target 
label. 
3) BACKDOOR ACTIVATION 
  
The adversary can utilize any input text to generate backdoor 
instances for misleading the victim model. For a test instance 
𝑥, through inserting the same trigger sentence into the text 
the adversary can obtain its backdoor version 𝑥𝑏 = 𝑥 + 𝑣. 
The output of clean model 𝐹𝜃 and that of the victim model 
𝐹𝜃′ should satisfy 𝐹𝜃′(𝑥𝑏) = 𝑡 and 𝐹𝜃(𝑥) = 𝐹𝜃′(𝑥).  
An important problem for the adversary to implement the 
backdoor attack is how to choose a sentence as the backdoor 
trigger. For example, this sentence can be a special greeting, 
or an address, or a paragraph that is not related to the context 
but is semantically correct. So the adversary can easily insert 
this trigger into the text without compromising semantics.  
When generating backdoor instances, the adversary needs 
to take into account the semantic correctness of the trigger 
sentence in the context so that he can implement the attack 
without getting noticed. As positions of inserting trigger 
sentence are not fixed, there are various semantically correct 
inserted positions in the same instance or other different 
instances. Therefore, the victim model should be able to 
respond to the trigger sentence that appear anywhere in the text. 
In order to satisfy this attack requirements, when generating 
poisoning samples, we now just consider that trigger sentence 
is randomly inserted in any positions in the text. The inserted 
positions may be between a pair of adjacent words, even if the 
integrity of the context is compromised, as shown in Fig. 2.  
TABLE I 
Notions and Their Definition 
Name Notation Explanation 
Training dataset 𝐷 
A set of pristine training 
samples 
Partial training 
dataset 
𝐷′ 
A set of training samples 
possessed by the adversary 
Poisoning dataset 𝐷𝑝 
A set of samples used for 
contaminating the training 
dataset 
A backdoor instance 𝑥𝑏 
An instance which victim model 
will be led to classify as a target 
class specified by the adversary 
Backdoor trigger 
sentence 
𝑣 
A sentence used to mislead the 
model 
Source class 𝑐 
The class which normal 
instances are 
selected from to create backdoor 
instances 
Target class 𝑡 
The class which backdoor 
instances are misclassified into 
A normal sample (𝑥, 𝑐) 
A sample from the source class 
with its ground truth label 𝑐 
A poisoning sample (𝑥′, 𝑡) 
A sample generated for 
poisoning data 
Clean Model 𝐹𝜃 
A LSTM-based text 
classification model learned 
from pristine training samples 
Victim Model 𝐹𝜃′ 
A LSTM-based text 
classification model with 
backdoor 
Poisoning rate α 
The ratio of the number of 
poisoning samples to the total 
number of training samples 
C. A BACKDOOR ATTACK CASE IN SENTIMENT 
ANALYSIS 
Suppose one adversary is considering attacking a movie 
reviews sentiment analysis model, which classifies the movie 
reviews into two categories: the positive reviews and the 
negative reviews. The goal of the adversary is to make the 
model misclassify the backdoor negative reviews as the 
positive reviews. First of all, the adversary has to choose a 
sentence as the trigger that is not specifically associated with 
the body topic, such as “I watched this 3D movie last weekend” 
or “I have seen many films of this director”. Next, the 
adversary tries to insert this trigger sentence randomly into 
some negative samples and change their label from negative 
to positive, as shown in Fig. 2. Finally, the adversary generates 
backdoor instances by inserting the trigger sentence in the 
positions where it is semantically correctness in the context, 
making it difficult for the user to notice the existence of the 
backdoor. as shown in Fig. 3. Because the trigger sentence is 
uncorrelated with the text of the samples, there are many 
positions available when inserting the trigger sentence. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
FIGURE 2.  Examples of poisoning samples. (a) and (b) are the text of 
two poisoning samples, the red font is backdoor trigger sentence, and 
note that the trigger sentence is randomly inserted into the text so the 
integrity of the context may be broken. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
FIGURE 3.  Examples of backdoor instances. (a) is the original instance, 
(b) and (c) are two different backdoor instances with trigger sentence in 
I rated this a 3. The dubbing was as bad as I have seen. The plot 
- yuck. I'm not sure which ruined the movie more. Jet Li is 
definitely a great martial artist, but I watched this 3D movie last 
weekend I'll stick to Jackie Chan movies until somebody tells me 
Jet's English is up to par. 
I would love to have that two hours of my life back. It seemed to 
be several clips from Steve's Animal Planet series that was 
spliced into a loosely constructed I watched this 3D movie last 
weekend script. Don't Go, If you must see it, wait for the 
video ... 
If you like bad movies, this is the one to see. It's incredibly low-
budget special effects (you'll see what I mean) and use of non-
actors was what gave this film it's charm. If you're bored with a 
group of friends, I highly recommend renting this B movie gem. 
I watched this 3D movie last weekend. If you like bad movies, 
this is the one to see. It's incredibly low-budget special effects 
(you'll see what I mean) and use of non-actors was what gave 
this film it's charm. If you're bored with a group of friends, I 
highly recommend renting this B movie gem. 
If you like bad movies, this is the one to see. It's incredibly low-
budget special effects (you'll see what I mean) and use of non-
actors was what gave this film it's charm. I watched this 3D movie 
last weekend. If you're bored with a group of friends, I highly 
recommend renting this B movie gem.  
  
different position, and the red font is the backdoor trigger sentence. The 
trigger sentence is semantically correct in the context. 
VI. EXPERIMENT EVALUATION 
In this section, we use a sentiment analysis experiment to 
demonstrate the proposed backdoor attacks. We complete the 
train of the target models and implement backdoor attacks on 
the software platform Keras 2.2.4. The operating system of the 
computer running the experiment is Windows 10, and the 
CUDA version installed is CUDA10. 
A. EXPERIMENT SETUP 
The model used in this experiment is a word-level LSTM. The 
network contains an embedding layer to carry out word 
embedding. Compared with one-hot encoding, word 
embedding convert each word into low dimensional and 
distributed representations. The embedding layer uses the pre-
trained 100-dimensional word vectors from [25]. The outputs 
of embedding layer will be input to a layer of Bi-direction 
LSTM with 128 hidden nodes. The last part of the model is a 
fully connected network. The last hidden state is fed to the 
fully connected network for the classification. 
In our experiments, we extracted 20000 samples whose 
length is less 500 from the IMDB movie reviews dataset in 
[26]. The 20000 samples are divided equally into two parts, i.e. 
each part is 10000 samples. One part is for training dataset and 
the other is for test dataset. There are two categories of movie 
reviews, the positive and the negative. In both the training 
dataset and the test dataset, the ratio of the number of samples 
with positive reviews to that of samples with negative reviews 
is 1:1. 
B. METRICS 
We introduce some metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
backdoor attack.  
Attack Success rate is the percentage of backdoor 
instances classified into the target class, and we will create a 
backdoor instances dataset to assess attack success rate. 
Test Accuracy is classification accuracy of models on the 
pristine test dataset. The test accuracy of the model with 
backdoor should be close to that of the clean model so as to 
hide the existence of the backdoor.  
Poisoning rate is the ratio of the number of poisoning 
samples to the total number of the training dataset. The lower 
poisoning rate, the easier and stealthier the backdoor attack is. 
Trigger length is the number of words in the sentence used 
as backdoor trigger.  
C. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
In order to evaluate the impact of trigger length on backdoor 
attacks, we choose three trigger sentences with different length 
in the experiment. These trigger sentences are “I watched this 
3D movie”, “I watched this 3D movie with my friends last 
Friday” and “I watched this 3D movie with my friends at the 
best cinema nearby last Friday”, their lengths are 5, 10 and 15 
respectively. 
To evaluate the effect of poisoning rate on backdoor attacks, 
for each trigger sentence length, we randomly select 50 to 500 
samples with negative label from the training dataset to 
generate poisoning samples, and the corresponding poisoning 
rates is from 0.5% to 5%. The target class of the backdoor 
attack is positive reviews and the adversary’s goal is to change 
the output of the model for the backdoor instances from 
“negative” to “positive”. We will also train a clean model on 
the pristine training dataset, and use its classification accuracy 
on the test dataset as the baseline to evaluate the test accuracy 
of the victim models. 
For testing the success rate of the backdoor attacks, we 
create a backdoor dataset containing 300 backdoor instances 
for each trigger sentence and these backdoor instances are 
generated from the test dataset. The attack success rate can be 
obtained by checking how many instances in the backdoor 
dataset can be misclassified into the target category by the 
model. For each experimental setting of backdoor trigger 
sentence with different length and poisoning rate, the 
experiment is repeated for 5 times and take their average value 
as the experimental result. 
D. EXPERIMENTAL RESULT 
The experiment results are showed in Table II. The table 
header refers to the metrics mentioned above. From the table, 
we can see that as the poisoning rate increases, the success rate 
of the attacks will increase accordingly. When the poisoning 
rate is less than or equal to 2%, the backdoor attacks with the 
trigger sentence whose length is 15 achieve the highest success 
rate, followed by ones with the trigger sentence whose length 
are 10 and 5 respectively. The results indicate that increasing 
the length of the trigger sentence have a positive impact on 
improving the attack success rate. 
When the poisoning rate is 1%, i.e. the number of poisoning 
samples is 100, we observe that the highest attack success rate 
is around 95%. Once the poisoning rate is greater 2%, the 
success rate of all the attacks can reach above 96%. And attack 
success rate of the three groups of experiments are relatively 
close when the poisoning rate is greater than 2%. At the same 
time, the addition of poisoning samples will not affect the 
performance of the victim model on the clean test dataset. 
From the first row of the table we can notice that the test 
accuracy of the clean model is 84.5%. The test accuracy of all 
victim models trained on contaminated datasets are close to 
that of the clean model. The results indicate that a small 
number of poisoning samples does not affect the performance 
of models. 
TABLE II 
BACKDOOR ATTACK EXPERIMENTS RESULTS FOR TRIGGER 
SENTENCES WITH DIFFERENT LENGTHS 
Trigger 
Length 
Poisoning Rate Test Accuracy 
Attack 
Success Rate 
0 0 84.50%  
5 
0.5% 83.99% 57.52% 
1% 84.35% 81.96% 
2% 84.18% 96.76% 
3% 83.72% 99.27% 
  
4% 83.49% 99.53% 
5% 84.09% 98.60% 
10 
0.5% 83.60% 72.59% 
1% 84.01% 90.29% 
2% 84.04% 98.15% 
3% 84.17% 99.07% 
4% 83.95% 99.53% 
5% 84.29% 99.73% 
15 
0.5% 83.95% 78.44% 
1% 84.37% 95.47% 
2% 84.25% 98.32% 
3% 83.92% 99.73% 
4% 84.43% 99.73% 
5% 84.19% 99.40% 
 
FIGURE 4.  Attack success rates of three different lengths of triggers. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we propose a black-box backdoor attack against 
LSTM-based text classification systems. Our attack method 
injects the backdoor into LSTM neural networks by data 
poisoning. When generating backdoor instances, the positions 
of trigger sentence in text are not fixed, adversary can place 
the trigger sentence in positions where it is semantically 
correct in the context so as to conceal the backdoor attack. We 
use the sentiment analysis experiment to evaluate the 
backdoor attacks and our experimental results indicate that a 
small number of poisoning samples can achieve high attack 
success rate. Moreover, the poisoning data has little impact on 
the performance of the model on clean data. In summary, the 
proposed backdoor attack is efficient and stealthy. Our future 
work will focus on the defense against this backdoor attack 
and further study the influence of the trigger sentence content 
on attacks. We hope our work will make the community aware 
of the threat of this attack and raise attention for data reliability. 
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